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Many real world complex systems such as infrastructure, communication and transportation net-
works are embedded in space, where entities of one system may depend on entities of other systems.
These systems are subject to geographically localized failures due to malicious attacks or natural
disasters. Here we study the resilience of a system composed of two interdependent spatially em-
bedded networks to localized geographical attacks. We find that if an attack is larger than a finite
(zero fraction of the system) critical size, it will spread through the entire system and lead to its
complete collapse. If the attack is below the critical size, it will remain localized. In contrast, under
random attack a finite fraction of the system needs to be removed to initiate system collapse. We
present both numerical simulations and a theoretical approach to analyze and predict the effect of
local attacks and the critical attack size. Our results demonstrate the high risk of local attacks on
interdependent spatially embedded infrastructures and can be useful for designing more resilient
systems.
PACS numbers: 05.40.-a,89.75.-k,89.60.Gg
Modern critical infrastructures are embedded in space
and have extensive interdependencies. Entities in one
network (e.g., power generation/distribution, communi-
cations, transportation etc.) are dependent upon enti-
ties in another and failures in one network can trigger
failures in another. It has been shown that these depen-
dencies lead to substantially decreased robustness and
even abrupt first order transitions which are absent in
isolated networks [1–16]. For spatially embedded inter-
dependent networks under random attack, it was shown
that if the maximal dependency link length is above a
critical value a new kind of abrupt collapse occurs, char-
acterized by a uniform spreading process [7, 17]. How-
ever, a purely random failure of a finite fraction of nodes
in a very large network can be unrealistic. A more real-
istic scenario is a failure of a group of neighboring nodes
due to a natural disaster like the 2011 To¯hoku earthquake
and tsunami or due to a malicious attack affecting all
networks in a given region (e.g., a nuclear strike) or only
certain infrastructures (e.g., an electromagnetic pulse or
chemical/biological attack). The resilience of a system of
interdependent networks to an attack of this sort, which
we call “localized attack,” has not been addressed before.
We show here that there exists a critical damage size
with radius rch, above which localized geographical dam-
age will spread and destroy the whole system and below
which it will remain localized (see Fig. 1). This criti-
cal size is determined solely by intensive system quanti-
ties and thus, in contrast to random failures, constitutes
a zero-fraction of the system in the large system limit,
N →∞.
The resilience of single complex networks to random
attacks [18–20] and malicious attacks targeting nodes
with special topological properties [21, 22] has been stud-
t
FIG. 1: Propagation of local damage throughout the network.
Under the same system conditions, the hole on the right is
above the critical size rch and spreads while the hole on the
left is below rch and remains almost the same size.
ied. Resilience to geographic localized attacks has been
studied on specific single networks [23–26], but a general
theoretical approach of such attacks is currently miss-
ing. In particular, the effects of cascading failures due
to interactions between networks has not been evaluated
with respect to localized attacks even though the positive
feedback caused by interdependencies has been shown to
have catastrophic consequences such as the 2003 Italian
blackout which resulted from a localized failure in a sys-
tem of interdependent networks [3].
The introduction of a percolation framework for ran-
dom coupled networks [4–6] brought attention to many
2other properties of coupled networks. Examples include
the study of transport [27], epidemic spreading [28], dif-
fusion [29], suppressing cascading loads [11], designing
robust coupled networks [30] and dynamical transitions
in coupled networks [31].
In this Letter, we study the new phenomenon of local-
ized attacks on interdependent spatially embedded net-
works. We find that even though the damage, connectiv-
ity and dependency links are all highly localized, a small
local attack (independent of system size) can spread and
destroy the entire network. We show that the system will
fail if a geographically local attack is greater than a criti-
cal size which is a zero-fraction of the system size. These
results have profound implications for the role of network
topology in the design of resilient infrastructures.
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FIG. 2: Phase diagram of the problem. (a) Depending on
〈k〉 and r, the system is either stable, unstable or metastable.
The circles shown in the metastable region illustrate the sen-
sitivity of the critical attack size that leads to system collapse
in the metastable region. For precise critical sizes for the
whole metastable region see Fig. 5 below. (b) Demonstration
of the theoretical considerations. Near the edge of a hole,
the survival probability of a node increases with the distance
from the edge. The parameter ρc denotes the distance from
the edge of the hole at which the occupation probability is
equal to pc ≈ 0.5927. In the case illustrated here, the clusters
have ample room to fall off and the damage will propagate
and destroy the whole system, even though the relative size
of the hole is small.
We model spatially embedded networks by assuming
two square lattices A and B with periodic boundary con-
ditions and overlaying them both on the same Cartesian
plane. Each node in network A is dependent upon a node
in network B (and vice versa) which is chosen at random
from all of the nodes within a radius r. If a node in
A is dependent on a node in B, the failure of the node
in B will cause the node in A to fail immediately and
vice versa. These dependency relationships are taken to
be mutual to prevent a single failure from propagating
through the entire system [12].
The interdependent networks are then diluted from de-
gree k = 4 to a lower average degree. This is accom-
plished by removing a random fraction 1−p of the nodes
from the system, along with the links that are attached
to them. This removal triggers a cascade which leaves the
average degree 〈k〉 lower than its value after site dilution
of 1 − p on a single lattice. Our motivation in reducing
the degree from 4 is based on empirical studies of the
power grid which have shown a characteristic degree of
〈k〉 ≈ 3 [32].
We examine the effects of localized geographical dam-
age of characteristic size rh for systems with different
values of r and 〈k〉. We model this damage by removing
a hole of radius rh from a random location in network A.
This triggers a cascade in which the nodes in B which de-
pend on the removed nodes fail, triggering further losses
as more nodes in B get cut off from the largest connected
component. The percolative damage in B triggers fur-
ther damage in A due to the dependencies between the
networks. This process is continued iteratively until no
more nodes fail. At the end of this cascade, the system
is categorized as functional or non-functional depending
on whether a finite-fraction largest connected component
remains or not.
For every system with a given r (maximal dependency
link length) and 〈k〉 we find that there is a critical damage
size rch below which the system remains intact and above
which the damage propagates throughout the system and
destroys it. Furthermore, we discovered three distinct
phases in this system according to which the k–r plane
can be divided into three distinct regions as shown in
Fig. 2a.
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FIG. 3: The critical attack size as function of average degree
〈k〉 for several r values. The curves represent moving along
vertical lines from bottom to top in Fig. 5 (the shown circles
in Fig. 2a) and show how rch varies with 〈k〉. For small r the
metastable state disappears and rch jumps from zero to infinity
while for larger r there is an intermediate regime where rch
increases gradually.
In the stable region, no matter how large rh is (as
long as it is finite) the damage will remain localized and
the system will stay intact. In the unstable region, the
system spontaneously collapses even with rh = 0 (no lo-
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FIG. 4: The critical attack size as function of system depen-
dency length r for several 〈k〉 values. The curves represent
the value of rch when moving along horizontal lines in Fig. 5
from right to left. The critical damage size rch takes a min-
imal value and the system is most susceptible to small local
attacks when r is near the stable phase.
calized attack). This is because in this region large holes
develop spontaneously due to percolation and overwhelm
the system [17]. The intermediate region is metastable.
Without the removal of a hole or the removal of a hole
smaller than rch, the system remains intact. However,
if a hole of size ≥ rch is removed, it will begin a cas-
cade that will eventually destroy the entire system. This
metastability is analogous to the well known supercool-
ing property of water in which water can be cooled well
below its freezing point and remain in the liquid phase
until a disturbance of some sort triggers crystallization
and it turns to ice [33].
In Figs. 3 and 4 we show, based on numerical sim-
ulations, how the critical damage size rch changes with
respect to r and 〈k〉. In Fig. 3, we see that for low 〈k〉,
rch is very small. For larger 〈k〉, we see that r
c
h increases
dramatically at a certain 〈k〉 value. The jump occurs at
larger 〈k〉 values for larger r values. In Fig. 4, we find
that the minimum of rch is found near the lowest r of the
metastable region, making it most susceptible to local
damage.
Since the metastable region spreads over a wide range
of realistic values of r and 〈k〉, it is of great interest to
understand how this transition takes place and to pre-
dict the value of rch(r, k). To present a theoretical under-
standing of this phenomenon, we first consider in detail
the chain of events triggered by the localized geographi-
cal damage. When a hole of rh is removed from A, it can
directly disable nodes in B up to a distance r from its
edge. The probability that a given node in B was depen-
dent on one of the removed nodes is highest at the edge
of the hole and decreases linearly until it equals zero at
distance r. This creates a lattice concentration gradient
in the form of an annulus of width r surrounding the re-
moved hole, see Fig. 2b. Taking ρ as the distance from
the edge of the hole, the gradient of occupation proba-
bility following an attack can be evaluated as
p(ρ, r, rh, 〈k〉) = ps(〈k〉)
I(rh, r, ρ)
pir2
(1)
where ps(〈k〉) is the system-wide occupation concentra-
tion and I(rh, r, ρ) is the standard formula for the area of
intersection of two circles of radius r and rh with centers
located a distance ρ + rh from each other. For a given
set of system parameters (r, rh, 〈k〉) we can set p = pc in
Eq. (1) and solve for ρ. If a solution in the region of inter-
est (0 < ρ < r) exists, it corresponds to a distance ρc at
which the lattice concentration will be equal to its critical
value. The existence of such a point is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for the hole to propagate. Below
pc, the lattice does not spontaneously disintegrate but
rather forms clusters of characteristic size ξ<(p), which
diverges at pc [34, 35].
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FIG. 5: The critical attack size, rch (represented by the color),
as a function of 〈k〉 and the system dependency length r. (a)
Simulation. We use a binary search algorithm to find the
critical radius size where the local attack spreads through the
entire system. (b) Model. The critical size is calculated as
the smallest value of rh for which Eq. (3) has a self-consistent
solution.
Hence the critical region 0 < ρ < ρc needs to be
wide enough for clusters of size ξ<(p) to form and break
away.The value of ξ<(p) is determined by the underlying
space topology and can thus be measured from a stan-
dard lattice using an appropriate estimation for p in the
0 < ρ < ρc region. From Eq. (1), p is not constant
and an exact solution for ξ< would require treating the
full gradient percolation problem [36]. In this work, for
simplicity we take p¯ which is the average of p over the
region of interest. Additionally, the removal of the hole
causes secondary damage due to dependencies in the an-
nulus and the concentration of the gradient is decreased
by a factor of g which we measure numerically and which
varies monotonically from 0.85 to 0.89 as a function of
r. We can thereby estimate p¯ ≈ g(r)
∫ ρc
0 p(ρ)dρ. We
evaluate ξ< following [34] as:
ξ2< =
1
Np
∑
(i,j)
|ri − rj |
2 (2)
4where (i, j) refers to nodes i and j which are in the same
connected component and Np is the total number of such
pairs of nodes. This leads to a self-consistent condition
for hole propagation:
ξ< < ρc (3)
both sides are functions of r, rh and ps. Using these con-
siderations, we can predict rch for every set of (k, r) pa-
rameters with close agreement to the numerical results,
see Fig. 5.
Everything about the scenario described above is lo-
cal: nodes in A and B can have dependency links only
up to length r, the connectivity links in A and B are
tied to an underlying lattice structure with characteris-
tic length of one and the attack is restricted to a hole of
radius rh. However, for a wide range of system parame-
ters, this leads to a catastrophic cascade which destroys
the entire system. In fact, the localization of dependency
opens the door for the spreading phenomenon that char-
acterizes such a collapse. When a hole of radius rh is
removed from A, the nodes in B that depended on them
must be within a distance r of the hole. Thus the sec-
ondary damage is highly concentrated around the edge
of the hole, leading to the creation of a damage front
which propagates outwards from step to step. If r →∞
or r→ 0, this weakness would not exist because the sec-
ondary damage would be spread out uniformly or remain
in place, respectively.
In Summary, we find that paradoxically, the highly lo-
calized topology of embedded interdependent networks
enables relatively small attacks to cause global damage.
Given the low average degree of the power grid [32, 37]
and its evidence of self-organizing criticality [38, 39], we
anticipate high susceptibility even to relatively small lo-
cal attacks.
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